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NUREMBERG AND GROUP PROSECUTION*
RICHARD ARENSt
INTRODUCTION
The trial of the Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg for crimes
against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity involved
not only the indictment of individual defendants but also the
indictment of the major Nazi organizations. 1
An aspect almost completely ignored in the welter of allega-
gations concerning the ex post facto basis of the Nuremberg
prosecutions2 is that concerning the infliction of collective or
group sanctions through adjudication of group criminality.
The question touching on the use of such sanctions for the
maintenance of public order has become particularly acute in
recent years in democratic society faced with the threat of global
violence. An ominous resort to group or collective deprivations
was highlighted in the Western world during World War II by
deportation of West Coast Japanese-Americans to "relocation
centers" in the name of security? A subsequent resort to the
infliction of such deprivations has become apparent in the
* This is the second of two studies on war crimes prosecutions prepared
for the Quarterly by Professor Arens.
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Buffalo.
1. The Nazi organizations indicted were Die Reichsregierung (Reich
Cabinet); Das Korps Der Politisechen Leiter Der Nationalsozialistischen
Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party); Die
Schutzstaffeln Der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei
(Commonly known as the "SS") and including the Sicherheitsdienst (Com-
monly known as the "SD"); Die Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police,
commonly known as the "Gestapo"); Die Sturmabteilungen Der N.S.D.A.P.
(commonly known as the "SA") and the General Staff and High Command
of the German Armed Forces. See 1 NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION iii.
2. See Ireland, Ex Post Facto From Rome to Tokyo, 21 ToMPLE L. Q. 27(1947); review of Glueck, The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War, 14
UNIv. CH. L. REv. 319 (1947); cf. Frank, War Crimes, Punishment For
Today-Precedent For Tomorrow, Collier's, Oct. 13, 1945, p. 11.
3. Military orders embracing sweeping restrictions upon all West Coast
residents of Japanese ancestry were sustained by the Supreme Court
against individuals whose loyalty was unquestioned. In Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), the Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of curfew orders; in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944), the Supreme Court upheld outright exclusion from the West
Coast.
See Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment, 45
COL. L. REv. 175 (1945) ; Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster,
54 YALE L. J. 489 (1945).
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attempt at the control of subversive groups through legislation
exemplified by the McCarran Act.4
While the issue of the acceptability of these latter day mani-
festations of group sanctions is not within the scope of this
paper, the issue as to whether the use of group sanctions at
Nuremberg was acceptable under democratic standards and as to
whether it provided impetus or incentive for duplication on these
shores embodies the central point of investigation.
A resolution of the issue requires re-examination of our dom-
inant attitudes toward collective or group sanctions and a review
of the lesson of Nuremberg.
The debate over the infliction of group sanctions at Nurem-
berg began in an atmosphere charged with moral indignation
brought about by the disclosure of a catalogue of Nazi crime
without parallel in human history.
The post war German scene confronted a bewildered world
with the inescapable fact of the stupendous scale of the premed-
itated and carefully executed mass murder, highlighted by the
crime of genocide: deliberate physical extermination with the
specific intent of achieving the outright extinction of ethnic and
religious groups, a crime involving millions of victims," and a
process requiring the overt participation of thousands within
Germany, most of whom were organized in specific organizations
for that purpose., The world was presented with the spectacle
of the unprecedented scale of direct and indirect participation
in the commission of that crime on broad, popular levels.
The initiation of any program of war crimes prosecution con-
fronted the Allies with the almost superhuman task of the detec-
tion of the killers and accomplices. It has become indisputable
that the vast majority of the less spectacular killers of the Nazi
system succeeded in submerging successfully within the broad
layers of a sympathetic populace. It has become equally indis-
4. See INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950, Chapter 1024-Public Law 831,
1 U.S. Code Congressional Service, (81st Congress, 2d Sess.) 984 (1950).
5. For a summary of the toll of genocide, see McDougal and Arens,
The Genocide Convention and the Constitution, 3 VAND. L. REv. 683 (1950) ;
for a good discussion of Nazi concepts of legality, See Czyzak, The Ideal
Legal Order for an Occupied Nation: Polish Commentary on Mitchell
Franklin, (1951) WAsH. U. L. Q. 188.
6. For the role of organizational units in the carnage see the judgment
of the International Military Tribunal, 22 Trial of the Mafor War
Criminals 498-523 (1946); see also KOGON, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
HELL (THE GERMAN CONCENTRATION CAMPS AND THE SYSTig BEHIND
THEM) (1950).
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putable that this submergence took place well after the final dis-
closure of the names of wanted war criminals. The process of
this reception of war criminals in the German fold was so rapid
that less than six years after the German defeat, official German
circles could make unequivocal demands for the amnesty of con-
victed mass murderers subject to prison sentences or execution.T
The process has its well-known historical parallel. A strong pop-
ular support of, and identification with, individuals charged with
atrocities had characterized the German response to Allied de-
mands for vigorous prosecutions after World War I.
The problem confronting the United Nations at the outset of
the attempt of war crimes prosecution was this: should the vast
majority of physical killers be permitted to escape unscathed
without even the infliction of ascertainable moral stigma in vin-
dication of the principle of strictest individual responsibility, or
should the concept of collective responsibility be used for pur-
poses of widening the prosecution-in derogation of traditional
standards of individual guilt? The problem involved a clear cut
balancing of interests. While the effects of a widened prosecution
appeared unforeseeable, it was clear that its abandonment would
entail continued circulation within Germany of thousands of
physical killers with explicit assurances of immunity.
7. See N.Y. Times, February 7, 1951, p.14, col. 1: "Germans Agitate For
New Reprieves." Or id., March 10, 1951, p.4, cols. 3, 4: "Gen. Baron
Alexander von Falkenhausen . . . and Gen. Eggert Reeder . . . were
sentenced today to twelve years' hard labor for war crimes.
A Belgian court-martial found the two Germans guilty of having ordered
the execution of 240 Belgian hostages. They also were accused of the arbi-
trary arrest and deportation of Jews and other Belgians....
West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer said today he was 'surprised'
by the sentence against General Falkenhausen....
Socialist Leader Kurt Schumacher said: 'I have the impression that those
who reached this verdict understood neither the political nor human prob-
lems involved.'"8. See GLUECK, WAR CRIMINALS, THEIR PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT,
19-36 (1944), and particularly id., 24, 25: "Though in signing the Peace
Treaty the Germans had solemnly obligated themselves to deliver up the
accused for trial, they soon reneged. In an article published in 1929, for
the archives of German-made history, Baron von Lersner, President of
the German Peace Delegation, pridefully recalls how the head of the
Peace Division of the German Foreign Office came to Paris early in
November to help him 'initiate diplomatic steps which would prevent the
surrender' of wanted 'war criminals.' These two worthies informed the
Allied diplomats that, 'the entire German Volk, without regard to class
and party, is of the conviction that it is impossible to deliver up the so-
called war criminals. .. .'
In Germany, feelings ran high upon receipt of the list. Von Lersner
proudly relates how mass meetings were held in churches and streets, and
how everywhere 'thousands upon thousands protested in the sharpest man-
ner against the Auslieferungsorderung.'"
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The need to vindicate basic rectitude standards in Germany
seemed paramount. Beyond the satisfaction of this need two ele-
ments of the world audience outside Germany required antidotes
to the examples of mass killings. The first was represented by
the world equivalent of the German "noncriminal" elements the
suppression of whose lawless impulses made mandatory, in the
absence of adequate media of mass therapy, by the example of
the infliction of negative sanctions against overt malefactors.,
The second consisted of those whose insight into their sadistic
tendencies obviated the need for vicarious expiation as well as
those whose sadistic tendencies were negligible to begin with.
Absence from the cultural response of energetic countermeasures
could be assumed to result in coarsening of the best of us in the
face of the unstemmed recurrence of the vice which, though
... to be hated needs but to be seen.
But seen too oft, familiar with her face,
We first endure, then pity, then embrace.
Part of the cultural response of the Western world to the need
of the moment was the demand for the indictment of the leading
Nazi groups. In the light of unparalleled tension and a degree
of European indignation capable of generating a St. Barthol-
omew's Night Massacre,0 the contemplated procedure seemed
endowed with the maximum possible concern for individual jus-
tice compatible with the maintenance of public order.
I
Orientation within an adequate semantic framework must pre-
cede further discussion. The word "sanction" is employed within
this paper throughout in lieu of the word "punishment."
The operative effect of the negative sanction will be seen to
exceed that traditionally recognized as the effect of "punish-
9. It is no longer subject to question that the personality dynamisms
which were at least partially responsible for the Nazi rampage are global
in scope and effect. The Nazi crimes are thus fully capable of stimulating
kindred manifestations abroad. A psychoanalytically oriented perspective
need not be confined to the study of interpersonal relations but has re-
levancy to the international field. See Gess, The Vanished Glory-A Prob-
lem In International Psychology, 37 THE PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEV 345(1950).
10. The extent of existing European indignation need be gauged only
by the extent of German pillage and murder. See, e.g., CREEL, WAR
CRIMINALS AND PUNISHMENT, 15-28 (1944); for the reflection of this
mood on an executive level, see RoosEvELT, As HE SAW IT, 188, 189 (1946).
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ment," though even the latter term has proved flexible in judicial
hands.
Formalistic doctrine tries to differentiate between judicially
inflicted deprivations comporting obloquy under formal criminal
auspices,"' judicially inflicted deprivations under so-called civil
auspices' - and non-judicially inflicted deprivations authorized
under prevailing community standards. 13 The greatest confusion
exists in the differentiation of these categories.
Detached appraisal will reveal all of these categories within
the postulated sanction process to be possessed of identical char-
acteristics. Each is characterized by the severity of deprivations.
The severity, in turn, is accompanied by a loss in respect sta-
tus as a concomitant part of the deprivational or punitive pro-
cess. The immediate objective may then be either loss of respect
status or alternately a sufficiently severe loss of another value
status to comport a loss of respect. In this context a formal
"criminal" conviction for a traffic violation does not embody the
form of "sanction" studied in the instant situation while the loss
of a civil suit on the basis of fraud charges does.
From the standpoint of ascertaining the existence of a sanc-
tion it is not vital that it be preceded by a formal declaration of
guilt, though guilt breeding will be an inevitable consequence. It
is immaterial whether it is administered under formal or infor-
mal auspices.
It is doubtful, for example, if much comfort is derived by in-
mates of administrative internment centers of totalitarian,
quasi-totalitarian or non-totalitarian states by the fact that their
internment takes place pursuant to administrative as distinct
from formal judicial orders and is justified not as the mandatory
punishment of guilt, but as "protective custody," "quarantine" or
what have you. 14 In a society accepting such internment the de-
11. The meaning and permissible scope of "criminal" sanctions are
discussed in Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); cf. Bridges
v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
12. The combined use of judicial obloquy under "civil" and "criminal"
auspices is aptly illustrated by United States v. United Mine Workers of
America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
13. Dismissals of civil servants pursuant to the federal loyalty program
present the best example. See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C.
Cir. 1950), affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court, 71 Sup. Ct. 669
(1951).
14. The lesson of recent European history is too fresh to need recapitula-
tion. For an example of American experience see ROSTOW, op. cit. supra
note 3.
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privation does not extend solely to physical well-being but to the
basic respect status of the individual involved.
It appears equally doubtful if the government employee con-
demned to slow but inexorable economic extinction for disloyalty
is comforted by the knowledge that his dismissal takes place pur-
suant to Presidential and not judicial order and is justified not
as the mandatory punishment of guilt but as a protective or pro-
phylactic measure.15 The deprivation goes both to well-being and
respect.
It is difficult to see that the person burned at the stake as a
presumptive as distinct from a true heretic after the sifting of
his thought processes by the Holy Inquisition derived great com-
fort from the differences in designations.'
The sanction, for purposes of this study, is defined as a value
deprivation of sufficient severity to encompass the loss of respect.
II
How far-reaching are sanctions in their repercussions upon
individuals and groups? And how far-reaching is our acceptance
of any group effect that they may have?
It is vital that the reader disabuse himself of several illusions
concerning the rejection of collective sanctions in contemporary
culture. The requirement of individual guilt as a prerequisite
to the infliction of sanctions has been more honored in the breach
than the observance even outside totalitarian societies whose use
of collective repression has been notorious in its most drastic
phase.
It must first be conceded that no sanction can confine its depri-
vational effect solely to the individual who constitutes its legit-
imate target. No method has yet been devised which is capable
15. See Emerson & Helfeld, Loyalty Among Government Employees,
58 YALE; L.J. 1 (1948); Kaplan, Loyalty Review of Federal Employees,
23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 437 (1948); of. Mr. Justice Black, concurring, in
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 71 Sup. Ct. 624, 634(1951), reversing the lower court judgment which dismissed complaints
asking for injunctive relief against the Attorney General's ex parte
designations of complaining organizations as subversive under the loyalty
program: ". .. the system adopted effectively punishes many organizations
and their members . .. because of their political beliefs and utterances."
16. An individual, guilty solely of the crime of being suspect of being a
heretic in the medieval phase of the operation of the Holy Inquisition, was
vouchsafed the right of purging himself by procuring the necessary number
of compurgators. Failure to so purge himself resulted in his condemnation,
albeit as a presumptive heretic. See 1 LEA, A HISTORY OF THE INQUISITION
OF THE MIDDLE AGES 455, 456 (1888).
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of immunizing all the "innocent" from the scope of the sanctions
inflicted upon the "guilty."',- The question confronting the sanc-
tion specialist is not so much one of tolerance but rather one of
the degree of conscious tolerance of sanctions having a collective
effect.
The scope of the use of group sanctions in most cultures is
generally proportionate to the instability and turbulence of the
times. Frequent use was made of group sanctions within primi-
tive communities.ls Even the birthplace of the common law saw
the use of group sanctions in a variety of forms: sectional group
loyalties were combatted by group sanctions in the interests of
centralized government with special ferocity throughout feudal
days. 9 Elimination of conditions of strife gave rise in at least
some cultures to the elimination of group sanctions in favor of
individualized justice.2" Insufficient empirical evidence is avail-
able to show conclusively whether the disorder produced by
severely conflicting group interests establishes the necessity of
group sanctions as a prime step to the establishment of an order
which in its elimination of anarchic turbulence might be capable
of producing a system of individualized justice. The evidence,
however, tends to show that such disorder has invariably pro-
duced group sanctions in each culture that has been exposed to it.
Nowhere perhaps is the growth of group sanctions as products
of turbulence more pronounced than in the anarchy of interna-
tional relations.
In the field of international law overwhelming evidence con-
17. It requires little imagination to visualize the severely deprivational
character of a sanction directed against the murderer by society in its
effect upon the immediate family of the condemned man. It does not
require much more imagination to visualize the comparable effect upon the
family of convicted burglars, arsonists or petty thieves. It requires little
imagination indeed to visualize the impact upon friends and relations of
the dismissal of a government employee for the "crime" of "disloyalty."
The fact that in all of these cases outsiders are inadvertent victims of the
sanction does not detract from the severity of its group effect.
18. See HOGBIN, LAW & ORDER IN POLYNESIA, pp. 76 et seq. (1934);
ef. MALINOWSKI, CRIME & CUSTOM IN PRIMITrvE SOCIETY; Radin, The Goal
of Law (1951) WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 1, 18-19.
19. Attaint and Forfeiture are elementary examples of such sanctions.
See PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, pp. 185, 382,
479, 480 (1936); for a striking example of the parliamentary form of
proscription in the form of the bill of attainder of a later day, See,
Appendix to Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 71 Sup. Ct. 624, 635 (1951).
20. See generally, NORTHROP, THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST (1946);
MALINOWSKI, FREEOM3 AND CIVILIZATION (1944).
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cerning a Western use of a system of group sanctions was inci-
sively presented by Professor Quincy Wright with the conclusion
that the present trend, while countenancing group penalties
under "civil," was veering toward a rejection of group penalties
under "criminal," auspices.21 The distinction appears tenuous
and unrealistic. The sole criterion of sanctions is the degree of
the severity of deprivations. "Civil" or "criminal" characteristics
of the auspices under which sanctions have been meted out ap-
pear irrelevant.
A plethora of names has come to designate the methods of the
infliction of group sanctions authorized by the Western doctrine
under prevailing Western conceptions of international law. War
nurtured several extreme examples.
The use of retaliation2 2 offers classic examples of a practice of
group sanctions tolerated by existing mores and unfettered
by any judicial restraint. Chief Justice Marshall's pronounce-
ment in 1815 remains declarative of the "law" of today :23
... The Court is decidedly of opinion that reciprocating to
the subjects of a nation, or retaliating on them its unjust
proceedings toward our citizens, is a political not a legal
measure. It is for the consideration of the government, not
of the courts. The degree and the kind of retaliation depend
entirely upon considerations foreign to this tribunal. It may
be the policy of the nation to avenge its wrongs, in a manner
having no affinity to the injuries sustained, or it may be its
policy to recede from its full rights and not to avenge them
at all. It is not for its courts to interfere with the proceed-
ings of a nation, and to thwart its views. It is not for us
to depart from the beaten track prescribed for us and to
tread the devious and intricate path of politics.
Mass detention of aliens and confiscation of "enemy" property
by executive and legislative authority illustrate traditional invo-
cations of sanctions upon no other basis than group affiliations. 24
It is useless to rationalize such actions as analogous to quar-
antine and hence in no way comparable to criminal penalties. The
21. See Wright, International Law & Guilt by Association, 43 Am. J.
INT'L L. 746, 748 (1949).
22. For examples of time-hallowed methods of retaliation, see 7 MOORE,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 182-183, 187, 865; cf. methods of retaliation
described in Arens, Vicarious Punishment and War Crimes Prosecution,
(1951) WASH. U. L. Q. 62.
23. The Nereide, 9 Cranch 388, 421-422 (1815).
24. See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); Miller v. United
States, 11 Wall. 268 (1871). Cf. VI HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 186, 187 (1943).
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severity of the deprivation inflicted by such sanctions makes the
nomenclature for the most part a matter of supreme indifference
to the victim. Where rectitude rationalizations were invoked, ju-
dicial approval of such sanctions was generally couched in terms
of the necessity of satisfying the superior claims of transcending
national interests at a time of stress. Speaking for a unanimous
Supreme Court on the subject of confiscation of enemy property
during the Civil War, Mr. Chief Justice Chase rejected the de-
fense of the owner's loyalty and sustained the right of confisca-
tion in these words :25
It is said that though remaining in rebel territory, Mrs.
Alexander had no sympathy with the rebel cause, and that
her property, therefore, cannot be regarded as enemy prop-
erty; but this court cannot inquire into the personal char-
acter and dispositions of individual inhabitants of enemy
territory .... Being enemies' property, the cotton was liable
to capture and confiscation....
The conclusion of a state of war has traditionally seen the use
of collective sanctions through the exaction of reparations or
indemnities-6-in the case of Germany after World War I accom-
panied by the exaction of an acknowledgement of collective war
guilt in the form of the "war guilt clause" of the treaty of
Versailles.27
Collective sanctions, however, do not remain confined to wars
and to their aftermath. In time of peace vicarious liability could
be visited on the collective entities known as states for injuries
inflicted by their nationals upon other states or their nationals. 28
And vicarious liability can be visited upon the nationals of
offending states without regard to any standards of individual
25. Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall. 404, 419-420 (1864).
26. For a well known example of reparations, see Allied Powers, Agree-
ments Concerning Deliveries In Kind To Be Made By Germany (London,
1922). For examples of the distribution of indemnities under American
conceptions of international law-see 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, 763 et seq. (1943).
27. Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles. For a historical analysis
of this problem see Adler, The War Guilt Question And American Dis-
ilfsionment, 23 JOURNAL OF MODERN HISTORY, 1 (March 1951).
28. See FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR
DENIAL OF JUSTICE (1938). BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIc PROTECTION OF
CITIZENS ABROAD, Chapter V (1915). Jessup, Responsibility of States for
Injuries to Individuals, 46 COL. L. REv. 903 (1946).
Still on the theoretical plane, the argument for State criminal responsi-
bility has been propounded with vigor in such works as Pella, L'Esprit de
Corps et les Probl*mes de la Responsibilitg Pgnale (1920); La Guarre-
Crime et les Criminels de Gu~rre (1946).
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"guilt." Doctrinal authority for this long-standing practice is
"Retorsion," defined as consisting of the treatment of "the sub-
jects of the state giving provocation in an identical or closely
analogous manner with that in which the subjects of the state
using retorsion are treated.1129 A moderate example of such prac-
tice is provided by recent history: When the Soviet-controlled
Hungarian government clamped travel restrictions upon United
States diplomatic personnel in Hungary-similar restrictions
were ordered by the State Department against Hungarian diplo-
matic personnel in this country.3 0
Use of collective sanctions in our culture, however, extends far
beyond the bounds of the anarchy of international relations.
Time and time again it is resorted to in the attempt at the main-
tenance of order amid the chaos of the complexities of modern
industrial life: a vicarious "criminal" liability for the acts of
others is attached with increasing frequency in the repression of
"nuisances" under regulatory legislation, 31 a wide scope is
afforded to vicarious criminal liability for the acts of others in
the repression of "criminal" conspiracies, 2 sanctions under
"civil" as well as "criminal" auspices are directed against the
"guilty" corporation 33 or unincorporated association 34 and hit
29. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 433 (8th ed., 1924).
30. N. Y. Times, January 30, 1951, p. 5, col. 2.
31. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); Sayre,
Criminal Responsibility for Acts of Another, 43 HAnv. L. REv. 689 (1930).
32. See note 58 infra.
33. Civil as well as criminal suits are available weapons for the social
control of corporate practices. The metaphysical obstacle of the criminal
prosecution of the soulless entity has long been surmounted. See Edgerton,
Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36 YALE L. J. 827 (1929); see also
MANNHSIM, WAR AND CRIME, 200 (1941):
"Is not the guilty mind a quality which can be attached exclusively to the
individual? And, if so, which are the consequences of this limitation? Does
it follow that a collective person can never be made criminally responsible
because it cannot act with a guilty mind, or does it rather follow that the
latter should not be treated as an essential requirement in cases where
the breach of the Criminal Law has been committed by a collective person?
At least, should that requirement not be considerably modified in order
to meet the special position of the collective person?"
cf. Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HAnv. L. REv. 404 (1916).
34. See State v. Kansas City Live Stock Exchange, 211 Mo. 181 (1908);
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Company, 259 U.S. 381 (1912).
Possibly the most far-reaching extant judicial version of the vicarious
liability of the members of an unincorporated association was presented by
Gibson, C. J., in Eichbaum v. Irons, 6 W. and S. (Pa.) 67, 69-70 (1843):
"Every member present assents beforehand to whatever the majority may do
and becomes a party to acts done, it may be directly against his will. If he
would escape responsibility for them, he ought to protest, and throw up
his membership on the spot. .. "
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the "innocent" stockholder or member-all without provoking
large-scale moral indignation for the violation of a dominant rec-
titude norm.
It is difficult to believe that this trend, if pursued in modera-
tion, clashes with the basic mores of the culture.
A trenchant expression of the ethical rationale of the develop-
ing situation has been provided by Morris Cohen :5
In our ethics the principle of individual responsibility that
each man shall be rewarded or punished according to his
own deed has been unquestioned. But in practice it is often
disregarded, because not applicable. It is impossible to iso-
late, in a complicated system of interaction between count-
less individuals, past and present, the part of the result due
to any individual deed. The principle of individual respon-
sibility postulates a world in which each individual can be
the sole producer of definite results, a world where each
individual can be the sole master of his acts and fate. This,
I submit in all seriousness, is not the world in which we
find ourelves . . .but while the principle of individual re-
sponsibility has remarkably little to commend it as a pri-
mary principle it is nonetheless useful as a secondary one.
III
If a cultural acceptance of group sanctions be conceded, the
quest for doctrinal tools can begin. What, then, were the doc-
trinal tools that lent themselves to the infliction of collective
sanctions under the municipal law of the West and East which
could be drawn upon for the Nuremberg prosecution?
The delegates of the four major powers who met in London in
the summer of 1945 to map out the ensuing program of war
crimes prosecution were each backed by a formidable body of
authoritative doctrine and practice in the field of group sanctions
invoked under their respective municipal law.
It is a fact that despite the widest cultural disparities between
East and West a backlog of doctrinal authority remained as an
adequate meeting ground for achievement of the group prosecu-
tion contemplated by the Nuremberg proceedings. The meeting
ground was provided by a community of thought on "conspir-
acy."
Nowhere, of course, did either Western doctrine or practice
reach the limits of its Soviet counterpart. The extremes reached
by the latter are highlighted by several examples. Soviet incor-
35. COHEN, REASON & NATUTRE 394 (1931). See also id. at 392-395.
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poration into criminal law of the doctrine of analogy which
renders any activity or association subject to punishment in the
discretion of the ruling elite, is one.3c Another is presented by
phases of authorized Soviet police practice. Subject to no super-
vision by any courts the "Special Boards" of the Ministry of the
Interior, empowered to deal summarily with "sabotage" or
"counter-revolution" are free to use any standards within their
discretion including their own concepts of collective guilt.Y
Moreover, the crudest example of the extremes of vicarious lia-
bility under the Soviet law was provided directly by the Criminal
Code: the adult members of the family of an individual desert-
ing from military service are explicitly declared subject to de-
portation to Siberia regardless of any absence of knowledge con-
cerning the commission of the offense.3 8
While conceptual difficulties obstructed Soviet use of the device
of indicting and trying groups or corporations as inanimate en-
tities existing solely in the contemplation of law,39 the widest
latitude was afforded to the Soviet officialdom in the prosecution
of the live membership for nefarious associations which could
have any descriptive label ranging from "banditry" to "counter-
revolutionary activity" attached to it by official edict.40 The con-
viction of the leaders of a criminal group, under the Soviet view,
was furthermore capable of raising the presumption of the guilt
of all of their subordinates so that the widest imposition of
vicarious liability was made possible.41
Justified as necessitated by the demands of state survival, So-
viet conspiracy concepts permitted proof of association for crim-
inal purposes to be presented by other than direct evidence and
were satisfied by indications of association of a highly tenuous
kind. 42
36. UGOLOVNY KODEKS RSFSR, Article 16.
37. BEiRAN, JUSTICE IN RUSSIA, 84 (1950).
38. Op cit. supra, note 36, Article 58.
39. See note 80 infra.
40. Op cit. supra, note 36, Articles 58 and 59.
41. See note 78 infra.
42. PEOPLE'S COMMIISSARIAT OF JUSTICE REPORT OF COURT PROCEEDINGS
IN THE CASE; OF THE ANTI-SOVIET 'BLOC OF RIGHTS & TROTSKYITES,' 694,
695 (1939) reporting Prosecutor Vyshinski's summation: "There is an opin-ion current among criminologists that in order to establish complicity it is
necessary to establish common agreement and an intent on the part of each
of the criminals, i.e., of the accomplices, for each of the crimes. This
viewpoint is wrong. We cannot accept it and we have never applied or
accepted it. It is narrow and scholastic. Life is broader than this view-
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It is thought-provoking and conducive to a sense of humility
that despite these practices the emerging Soviet doctrine of crim-
inal conspiracy should converge with ease with its Anglo-Amer
ican counter-part, albeit in the more restrictive pattern pre-
scribed by the Nuremberg Charter.
While French doctrine alone has scorned the pitfalls of "con-
spiracy" it has none the less authorized prosecution for member-
ship in organizations formed for the purpose of criminal
activities. 43
As in the case of the Soviet doctrine, a psychological accep-
tance of its Anglo-American counterpart as a dragnet of formid-
able scope rested at least to a large extent on the assumption that
it was necessary for the prevention of outright social disintegra-
tion. Mr. Justice Jackson diagnosed the modern conception of
conspiracy as "so vague that it almost defies definition, ' 4 as
apparently manipulable with the greatest latitude, and as
emerging from a history of political struggle :45
The crime comes down to us wrapped in vague but un-
pleasant connotations. It sounds historical undertones of
treachery, secret plotting and violence on a scale that men-
aces social stability and the security of the state itself.
Notwithstanding the fact that the ethical justification of the
concept would appear founded on nothing short of the necessity
of societal survival, and hence preclude authorization of dragnet
prosecutions for matters which did not threaten the most vital
national interests, conspiracy has formed the gist of innumerable
criminal charges for acts ranging from espionage to the petty
misdemeanor .4
Standard definitions succeed in raising more questions than
they can answer. Thus conspiracy has been defined as "a com-
bination of two or more persons to do an act which is unlawful
in itself or to do a lawful act by the use of means which are un-
lawful,' '1 7 a "partnership in criminal purposes, 48 even more
point. Life knows of examples when the results of joint criminal activity
are brought about through the independent participation in such activity
by individual accomplices, who are united only by a single criminal object
common to all of them."
43. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, TRAITI DE DROIT CRIMINEL 249, 250 (1947).
44. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446 (1949).
45. Id. at 448.
46. For a brief view of the scope of "conspiracy," See MILLER, HANDBOOK
OF CRIMINAL LAW, 108-11 (1934.)
47. Id. at 108.
48. United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608 (1910).
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briefly as a "partnership in crime."4 9 Inevitably it is permissible
to prove the crime of conspiracy by a showing of the requisite
mental state coupled with what would otherwise be innocuous as-
sociation.50 The requisite mental state, however, need not be
shown to have become manifested by simultaneous action or
agreement between the conspiratorsA1 The association which is
established need not be direct and may be tenuous indeed. 2
Capping the collective impact of "conspiracy" is the rule that
vicarious criminal liability can be attached to each conspirator
for the acts of his fellows in furtherance of the criminal design.5 3
While the standard of proof at no time appears formally reduced
below the requirements of the ordinary case, the net effect of the
doctrinal design which seems almost indistinguishable from its
Soviet counterpart, weighs the scales heavily in favor of the
prosecution.54
In such a context it is not altogether surprising to find a court
sustaining a conspiracy charge upon the theory that conspira-
torial association and agreement could be consummated without
direct contact among the conspirators but through one person
"round whom the rest revolve."5 3 The metaphor which described
the process according to the court was "the metaphor of the
centre of the circle and its circumference." ' Formal agreement
was unnecessary to such a crime. The requirement of proof
with regard to the formation or existence of the agreement,
moreover, was no more strict where the prosecution attempted to
establish the vicarious criminal liability of one co-conspirator,
for the acts of another. It was thus possible for the Supreme
Court of the United States to uphold the conviction of a defen-
dant for the acts committed by his co-conspirator without the
49. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946).
50. See Harno, Intent In Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. OF PA. L. REV.
624 (1941). Cf. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208
(1938).
51. Schenck v. United States, 253 Fed. 212, 213 (E. D. Pa. 1918); aff'd
249 U.S. 47 (1918). Cf. discussion of "generic conspiracies" for purposes of
criminal prosecutions under the Sherman Act in DESSION, CRIMINAL LAW,
ADMINISTRATION & PUBLIC ORDER 526-527 (1948).
52. See Allen v. United States, 4 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1925).
53. See MILLER, op. cit. supra, note 46 at 114.
54. See Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or
Protection of Individual Defendants, 62 HARv. L. REv. 276 (1948).
55. Rex v. Meyrick and Ribuffi (1929) 21 Cr. App. R. 94, 102.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid. Cf. Madsen v. United States, 165 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1947).
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knowledge or approval of the defendant who in fact was in
prison at the time of the crimes, on the theory that they were
chargeable to him as acts in furtherance of an agreement to
which he had become a party.5 8 Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking
for the Court, declared direct knowledge of or participation in
the crime unnecessary to sustain a conviction :9
The criminal intent to do the act is established by the forma-
tion of the conspiracy. Each conspirator instigated the
commission of the crime.
Agreeing was thus turned into the equivalent of aiding and
abetting.-
Add to the use of the conspiracy doctrine the device of the cor-
porate prosecution and/or the proscription of the mere forma-
tion of, and participation in, specific organizations and a puni-
tive dragnet could be widened almost at will by the prosecutor.
Illustrative of the latter, before the Nuremberg trial, was the
Smith Act 1 on the federal, and the California Criminal Syndi-
calism Law,'32 on the state level. While the Supreme Court has
not yet passed upon the former, at the time of the writing of this
article, it upheld the constitutionality of the latter. 3 The opera-
tion of that law has been described with telling effect by Mr. Jus-
tice Brandeis :64
The mere act of assisting in forming a society for teaching
syndicalism, of becoming a member of it, or of assembling
with others for that purpose is given the dynamic quality
of crime . . . The novelty in the prohibition introduced is
that the statute aims, not at the practice of criminal syndi-
calism, nor even directly at the preaching of it, but at asso-
ciation with those who propose to preach it.
Combine the use of the prohibition against conspiracy with the
use of prohibition under such a statute and you prosecute for
associating with an intent to associate with individuals evincing
58. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). See also Note,
Vicarioas Liability for Criminal Offenses of Co-Conspirators, 56 YALE L. J.
371 (1947).
59. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
60. Mr. Justice Jackson's comment upon earlier decision in Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 451 (1949); Cf. People v. Luciano, 277 N.Y.
348, 14 N.E. 2d. 433 (1938).
61. 62 STAT. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C. 2385 (supp. 1950).
62. 3 CAL. GEN. LAWS, Act 8428 (Deering 1944). For discussion of
comparable legislation in other jurisdictions see 2 U.S. Code Congressional
Service, 81st Congress, 2d Sess. 1950, 3886.
63. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
64. Id. at 373.
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an intent to preach the virtues of illegal association. Concede to
the prosecution a reduction in the required standard of proof and
the conspiracy prosecution becomes sui generis. If a rectitude
rationalization be sought at that stage the unprecedented lati-
tude afforded to the prosecution can be justified by the inherent
difficulties of procurement of evidence of secret associations and
by reference to the enormity of an offense whose repression is
dictated by state survival.
It is startling that official attempts at the justification of such
latitude under United States and Soviet auspices should reveal an
uncanny similarity of attitude. Thus for the United States in the
words of Judge Cox speaking for the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1909 :65
Conspirators do not go out upon the public highways and
proclaim their purpose; their methods are devious, hidden,
secret and clandestine. It is enough that they have a com-
mon purpose.., and that they act together for that purpose.
It is not necessary that a formal agreement be proved; it
is sufficient if the testimony shows that the parties are act-
ing together understandingly to accomplish the same ...
purpose, even though individual conspirators may do acts
in furtherance of the common unlawful design apart from
and unknown to the others.
Thus for the Soviet Union in the words of Prosecutor
Vyshinski speaking in the course of a political mass trial in
1937:66
You cannot demand that cases of conspiracy of coup de'6tat
be approached from the standpoint: give us minutes, deci-
sions, membership cards, the numbers of your membership
cards; you cannot demand that conspirators have their con-
spiratorial activities certified by a notary. No sensible man
can put the question in this way in cases of State conspiracy.
A survey of the existing doctrinal background of the four pros-
ecuting powers makes it plain that the prosecution was not left
to grope for the creation of doctrine to justify the application of
group sanctions on the German scene. Existing doctrine pos-
sessed every flexibility.
Mr. Justice Jackson, therefore, was hardly stretching the point
when he cited the municipal law of the four powers in support of
his demand for a judicial declaration of the "collective crim-
65. Marrash v. United States, 168 Fed. 225, 229 (2d Cir. 1909).
66. The Moscow Trial, 205 (London 1937).
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inality" of the indicted groups. 67 The doctrinal authority for
such action seemed exhaustive. Reliance on it does not ipso facto
furnish grounds for criteism. The history of the abuse of doc-
trinal authority should not make for the rejection of doctrinal
authority out of hand. It remains to determine whether an
abuse took place at Nuremberg.
IV
It seemed strange at first glance that it was the United States
representative in the four-power negotiations on the prosecution
of Nazi criminals, who pressed insistently for a commitment to
seek a judicial declaration of collective criminality at Nuremberg
and that it was the Soviet representative who as insistently
opposed it.
The United States plan was motivated by the conviction of the
necessity of coping with the unprecedented challenge of Nazi
crime and the desire to do this with the least infringement of the
traditional safeguards. It was motivated too by a concern for
the need for a public revelation of the character of the Nazi
groups and for the collective effect of their moral stigmatization
in the Allied world and Germany.
The contemplated United States prosecution technique envis-
aged the indictment and trial of specific Nazi organizations upon
charges of criminal conspiracy and substantive offenses in a
manner analogous to corporate prosecution for crime, their adju-
dication as criminal conspiratorial groups, and the subsequent
trial of any of their members for adherence as well as for their
vicarious responsibility for any criminal acts perpetrated in
furtherance of their criminal design. 8 Under this prosecuting
plan adequate notice was to be given of the contemplated initial
group prosecution and adequate opportunities for the defense of
the accused groups afforded to such of their members as could
reasonably be expected to do justice to the representation of their
interests.r9 While the challenge to the group indictment under
this plan was to be unlimited in the proceeding which was
to secure the judicial declaration of their criminality, the
achievement of this objective was to foreclose for all time
67. See JACKSON, THE NuRNBERG CASE, 103 et seq. (1947); cf. 8 TRIAL
OF THE MAJOR WAR CRDIINALS, 361 (1946).
(18. See INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRLALS 7, 32 (1949).
69. Id. at 58.
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the question of their group guilt as res adjudicata.7 Sub-
sequent proceedings for the trial of their individual mem-
bers could restrict themselves solely to considering the
proof of individual membership and such personal defenses
on the merits or in extenuation as ignorance of the crim-
inal character of the groups, the subjection of the defen-
dants to duress at the time of joining, and the degree of partici-
pation in group activities.- On all of these matters, however, the
burden of proof was to shift to the accused. 2
The envisaged United States program was thus to fall into
two stages: the initial trial of the groups on the issue of conspi-
racy and substantive crimes; and the subsequent trial of affil-
iated individuals on the issue of membership. The dragnet was
to be consciously broadened to prevent the escape of at least
major offenders. Operation of this contemplated dragnet has
been well described by Mr. Justice Jackson as a prosecutor :73
Now let us see what we are trying to reach by this method
that we might not reach otherwise. Let us suppose that
there is a very active member of the S.S.-active in organ-
izing, active in getting new members-but he never took a
part in a single crime. He helped to formulate the general
plan; he knew about it; he knew the methods; he knew that
their plan was to exterminate minorities, to run concen-
tration camps, to do all these things; but you cannot prove
by any witness that he was present when a single offense,
standing by itself, was committed. By reason of his mem-
bership in this common criminal plan and by reason of his
participation in it, we would expect to reach him. Now the
difficulty is that there are several hundreds of thousands of
members of these organizations. You cannot get witnesses,
at least we hadn't thought we could get witnesses,
to prove where each was at all times and prove what he did.
It is very hard to identify persons who are in uniform and
to get accounts of their part in acts of the organized mili-
tary or parliamentary units. Therefore, we would expect to
be able to show what offenses were committed, and then
every person who was a part of that general plan, whether
he actually held the gun that shot the hostages or whether
he sat at a desk somewhere and managed the accounting,
would be responsible for the acts of the organization.
70. Id. at 59.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Id. at 138, 139.
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In effect then the first adjudication of collective criminality
was to establish a presumption of guilt on the part of group
members for future trials. While such a presumption unques-
tionably clashed with the traditional democratic presumption of
innocence of one charged with crime, such a clash was reduced
by the fact that the accused was vouchsafed the opportunity of
vicarious personal defense through the defense of the indicted
organization at the first trial which was to be held without any
prejudicial presumption; and that the subsequent presumption
must be regarded as rationally justifiable in the light of the
overwhelmingly voluntary nature of major Nazi organizations
and the publicity accorded to their work.
Soviet opposition to the prosecution of the Nazi groups in no
way stemmed from reluctance to engage in dragnet prosecutions
or from concern for the niceties of procedural fairness though
occasionally their arguments were couched in those terms. If
anything it stemmed from the fear that the dragnet was not
sufficiently secure, a fear compounded by emotional and political
compulsion to assert for prestige purposes, if for no other reason,
characteristically Soviet legal patterns. Thus initial Soviet
responses to United States suggestions for adoption of the prin-
ciple of group criminality were to the effect that in the presence
of superior executive declarations of the criminality of such
Nazi groups, a quest for further judicial declaration seemed
superfluous: 4 Moreover, the inference, raised by formal group
indictment, continued the Russians, suggested that the issue of
group guilt or innocence had remained open. Nothing could be
further from the truth, asserted Soviet spokesmen: The issue
was deemed foreclosed once and for all by the expression of gov-
ernmental policy.75 Soviet spokesmen, moreover, proceeded to
question the wisdom of group prosecutions in terms of purely
practical obstacles. What would happen, they asked, if upon
notice issued that at the trial the court would be asked to pro-
nounce, say, the Gestapo a criminal organization and that any-
body who wished to dispute this should come forward, "some
hundreds of the members of the Gestapo . . . (were to come)
forward to defend the case of the organization."7
74. Id. at 107.
75. Ibid.
76. Id. at 235.
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The gist of the Soviet suggestion on the accomplishment of the
creation of the dragnet without benefit of initial group prosecu-
tion was essentially the reverse of the United States proposal.
Where the United States representative urged the declaration
of the criminality of groups as a preliminary to the declaration
of the criminality of individuals, the Soviet representative urged
the declaration of the criminality of individuals, as a preliminary
to the declaration of the criminality of groups.7 7 Specifically,
the Soviet spokesman announced as fundamental to Soviet crim-
inal law that "a decision of the court which establishes the crim-
inal responsibility of the heads or the leaders of any organiza-
tion of that kind automatically establishes the criminal respon-
sibility of the various subordinate members of the organiza-
tion."78 The practical implication of the theorem is presumably
this: Convict the leaders of a group in a demonstration trial
and then round up the surviving members for forced labor in the
Siberian salt-mines. The clash of views is nowhere better illus-
trated than in this exchange :7
GeneraZ Nikitchenko.... If a member is found whose guilt
consists in being a member, then you have declared that the
organization itself is criminal....
Mr. Justice Jackson. Well, you see we have a fundamentally
different concept and that is what I am afraid of.
Principles of Soviet criminal law were drawn upon for further
support of the Soviet position. Almost in one breath it was de-
clared that Soviet doctrine did not recognize the possibility of
formal criminal prosecution of inanimate entities existing solely
in the contemplation of law,80 that on the other hand it provided
exhaustive opportunity for the widest dragnet prosecution of
their individual flesh and blood membership,81 and that it none
the less based the administration of criminal law "on the fact of
77. Id. at 135, 136, 217.
78. Id. at 135.
79. Id. at 217.
80. Id. at 134: "The Soviet Law . . . fully recognizes in exactly the
same way as the French, and probably others, the collective responsibility
of members of an organization for the crimes committed by the organiza-
tion. The theory of the Soviet criminal law fully recognizes the trial of
gangs or organizations and the responsibility of the members of such
organizations in addition to any individual responsibility they may carry
for individual acts. Where we do not agree is in the idea that the trial of
organizations should form actually the basis of the agreement for the
trial of criminals. An organization is not a physical body ...
81. Id. at 135.
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the individual criminal responsibility of the individual person. '82
It is difficult in the absence of more information concerning
the then current transactions on a more important power level
than that of the prospective prosecutors' conference to establish
the reasons for the ultimate Soviet acceptance of the United
States view with anything like precision. Certain it is that the
official Soviet rationalization for this move expressed agreement
with the United States view that such a group prosecution was
vital to anything like the effective repression of Nazi criminal
elements at least in the Western zone, and that more than any
other act it would serve to enlighten the outside world as to the
structure and operation of the Nazi state. A closing exchange
between the representatives of American and Soviet legal
thought seems revealing: 3
Mr. Justice Jackson. I don't want to prolong the discussion,
but you don't want to depend on American judges to know
all about the Gestapo. You must remember your people are
much nearer to this scene than we have been. Information
comes through radio, which we sometimes doubt, and news-
papers which we sometimes suspect of exaggeration. This
experience is not so well known in the United States that
you can depend on a judge to assume it. The evidence we
have found since I came here the first time has utterly
astonished me, and I followed the Nazi regime fairly closely
because I had something to do with the effects of the war
on us under President Roosevelt's administration. These
organizations are criminal beyond anything that I can
dream. I think proof of their acts really means more to
understanding by the United States of the problem you have
had to deal with, and are going to have to deal with on this
Continent, than you think.
Professor Trainin. It is because of that consideration that
we have accepted the American view that the verdict must
apply to the whole of the organization.
The ground was laid for group prosecution in its contemplated
two stages.
V
The first stage of this phase of prosecution could begin.
Indicted with the "twenty-odd broken men" representing the
Nazi elite,"' for conspiracy to commit, and the substantive com-
82. Ibid.
83. Id. at 241, 242.
84. See Mr. Justice Jackson's opening address for the prosecution, 2
TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 99 (1945).
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mission of, Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes
against Humanity were the Nazi organizations representing the
mainstay of Nazi power.8' The specificity of the charges con-
tained in the indictment was far in excess of that of the average
accusation in Anglo-American jurisdictions." While the effect
of the sought for verdict of "guilty" against these groups was to
secure an authoritative and unquestioned moral condemnation
of all that they stood for, it was also to "render prima facie
guilty, as nearly as we can learn, thousands upon thousands of
members now in custody of United States forces and of other
armies."87
The proceedings were instituted under Charter provisions
requiring adequate notice to the membership of the organizations
indicted and for leave within sound judicial discretion for indi-
vidual members to come forward and be heard on the subject of
group criminality, as well as the right of the indicted groups to
be represented by counsel. 8
The prosecution relied heavily on domestic municipal prece-
dent for group action. Without being required to do so under the
Nuremberg Charter, it set itself the following standards of
proof. The prosecuted groups had to be shown to be composed of
"persons associated in identifiable relationship with a collective
general purpose." Membership had to be voluntary: "Was the
organization on the whole one which persons were free to join
or to stay out of? Membership is not made involuntary by the
fact that it was good business or good politics to identify one's
self with the movement."89 The criminality of action or purpose
was to be interpreted in the strict sense of the indictment and
had to be sufficiently open and notorious to provide adequate
notice thereof to the membership at large, although the prosecu-
tion was not to be required "to establish the individual knowledge
of every member or to rebut the possibility that some may have
joined in ignorance of... (the) true character" of the groups.90
Lastly, some individual defendant had to be shown to have been
85. See note 1 supra.
86. The form of the indictment followed the Continental pattern in
including evidentiary matter. See 1 NAzI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION
14-56 (1945); of. JACicSoN, THE NURNBERG CASE vi-viii (1947).
87. See Mr. Justice Jackson, supra note 84, at 152.
88. See 1 NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 4, 6 (1946).
89. 8 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 367 (1946).
90. Id. at 368.
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a member of each of the indicted groups "and... (had to) be
convicted of some act on the basis of which the organization was
declared to be criminal."' Traditional Anglo-American con-
spiracy concepts were adequate to fulfill the tasks set itself by
the prosecution. It was thus completely unnecessary to show the
participation in criminal activities by all individual members.
It was enough if a part was engaged in crime.92 The primary
objective was to prove that the ends pursued by these groups
were criminal. The execution of acts in furtherance of those
ends by any member were then chargeable upon the membership.
Orthodox Anglo-American conspiracy doctrine was invoked :93
The criteria for determining whether these ends were guilty
ends are obviously those which would test the legality of
any combination or conspiracy. Did it contemplate illegal
methods or purpose illegal ends? If so, the liability of each
member of one of these Nazi organizations for the acts of
every other member is not essentially different from the
liability for conspiracy enforced in the courts of the United
States against business men who combine in violation of the
anti-trust laws, or other defendants accused under narcotic
drugs act, sedition acts, or other Federal penal enactments.
The unfolding of the case against the Nazi groups did not in
fact differ materially from the unfolding of the average conspir-
acy case in the federal courts of the United States, with the one
marked exception that affidavit evidence was admitted,94 not,
however, in any serious violation of the principles of general
Continental practice95 The opportunity for defense on both the
facts and the law was ample. Counsel for the various organiza-
tions indicted were not only able to argue and argue with elo-
quence that the collectivities they represented, such as, e.g., the
S.A., had political objectives based upon patriotism and civic
virtue and attracted high-minded individuals" but, even in cases
where the iniquity of a group, such as the Gestapo, was conceded,
that a collective adjudication of guilt flouted natural justice and
91. Ibid.
92. Id. at 368.
93. Id. at 365.
94. The tribunal was not bound by any technical standards of evidence
under the charter. See 1 NAzI CONSPIRACY AND ArCRssroN 9 (1945).
95. Not all French courts, for example, require the personal presentation
of witnesses to secure the admissibility of their evidence. See DONNEDIEU
DE VABRES, TRAITP DE DROIT CnmtMiNE 793 (1947).
96. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 169 (1946).
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used the methods for which condemnation was sought through
the Nuremberg judgment. 7
Found guilty by verdict of the tribunal were the Leadership
Corps of the Nazi Party, the Gestapo and S.D. and the S.S.29
Acquitted were the S.A., the Reich Cabinet, and the German
General Staff and High Command.9 9 It is safe to conclude that
the tribunal was meticulous in its sifting of evidence concerning
the activities of indicted groups. Evidence concerning the
notoriety of and collective participation in, the myriad of Nazi
crime, by the convicted groups, was overwhelming. The benefit
of a doubt, however slight, was accorded to the defendant groups.
Featured among the acquitted groups, the S.A., for example, was
officially described in the verdict of the tribunal as the "strong
arm of the Party" responsible in large part for the "Nazi reign
of terror over Germany" in its early days, suffering a reduction
in influence after June 30, 1934, but lending isolated units for
such bagatelles as the Austrian "Anschluss," Czech disintegra-
tion, the blowing up of synagogues in the Jewish pogrom of
November 1938, and the physical extermination of Jews in
Eastern Europe." o
The verdict concerning all of the convicted groups carried the
proviso that it applied only to those individuals who became or
remained members with knowledge of their' criminal activities
or who were personally implicated in their crimes and excluding
from its operation those "who were drafted into membership by
the State in such a way as to give them no choice in the mat-
ter."2101
Conclusion of the first stage of the prosecution left the world
waiting expectantly for the second. The world had been led to
believe that the hundreds of thousands of the membership of the
convicted organizations would be brought to account before
occupation tribunals operating under the first Nuremberg
judgment. This was never done. It is safe to state with the
benefit of hindsight that abandonment of the scheme of mass
prosecution was not prompted by any sense of rectitude dictating
97. 21 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 493-498 (1946).
98. For the tribunal verdicts concerning the accused organizations see
22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRImINALS 498-523 (1946).
99. Ibid.
100. Id. at 517-519.
101. See, e.g., the conclusion of the opinion on the SS, id. 517.
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individualization of justice. If anything, the dominant factor
in the abandonment of previously declared policy was a growing
indifference to the task of the stigmatization of Nazi criminality
and the controlling thought of the need for Allied rapproche-
ment with Germany. West and East engaged in an undignified
scramble for the loyalty of a formerly despised enemy who was
to become a comrade in arms for a war of either cold or hot
variety. The fact that Allied abandonment of membership pros-
ecutions was not even remotely related to a concern for individ-
ualization of justice was perhaps best demonstrated by the fact
that the Germans themselves were encouraged to try their own
nationals for group membership before local German denazifica-
tion tribunals set up with the official blessing of the Allies.10 2
The well-known denazification fiasco was the result. 03
In the meantime, a selective Western prosecution of overt Nazi
criminals was initiated after the first trial. 0 4 Such prosecution
included the charge of membership in criminal organizations
but was in no case in the Western zones based upon membership
alone.1u7 In a few instances, however, conviction of individuals
was based solely upon the membership charge. it is unques-
tionable that the proceedings so far from shocking to any dem-
ocratic sense of justice were fastidious in probing for individual
guilt and involved a clear-cut curtailment of the conspiracy
theory. The case of Poppendick in the Medical Trial0 r is illus-
trative of the meaning of guilt on the ground of membership in
the context of post-war United States prosecutions.
Poppendick was a co-defendant in the prosecution of several
luminaries of the Nazi medical profession for murderous "exper-
102. See Raymond in N. Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1949, p. 3, col. 1 for a brief
survey of the history of "denazification."
103. Ibid. See also Marcus, in N. Y. Times, May 12, 1949, p. 30, col. 6,
citing the following figures. Out of almost 13,000,000 people who registered
under the denazification law nearly 2,500,000 were amnestied without
trial, 9,500,000 were exonerated to all intents and purposes, 33.5% of
those tried became the beneficiaries of subsequent amnesties and one tenth
of one percent were found to be major offenders. In Bavaria, 83% of thejudges, 81% of the public prosecutors and some 11,000 teachers are former
Nazis; in Schleswig-Holstein 91% of all judges, prosecutors and court
officials are former Nazis. And see Baldwin, id., April 10, 1949, p. 13,
col. 1: "There has been no real political or spiritual regeneration."
104. See TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE
NITERNBERG WAR CRIMEs TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10
(1949).
105. Brigadier General Telford Taylor in letter to writer.
106. Taylor, op. cit. supra note 104 at 163.
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iments" carried out upon concentration camp inmates. Specif-
ically, Poppendick, a medical colonel in the S.S., was charged
"with personal responsibility for, and participation in, High-
Altitude Freezing, Malaria, Sulfanilamide, Sea-Water Epidemic,
Jaundice, Sterilization, Typhus, and Poison experiments."'17 He
was charged too "with being a member of an organization
declared criminal by the judgment of the International Military
Tribunal."108 The proof of the acts themselves was irrefutable.
Proof of Poppendick's direct personal participation was not,
according to the tribunal, "beyond reasonable doubt." Proof of
his knowledge of, and acquiescence in, the experiments was
ample. Proof, in fact, of his tacit collaboration in the Nazi-
imposed medical pattern, of which these "experiments" were
a part, was abundant. Much of this proof was furnished by
Poppendick's personal admissions. Thus, as recounted by the
judgment of the case,
Poppendick stated that the Nazi racial policy was twofold
in aspect; one policy being positive, the other negative in
character. The positive policy included many matters, one
being the encouragement of German families to produce
more children. The negative policy concerned the steriliza-
tion and extermination of non-Aryans.20 1
Poppendick, of course, asserted that his overt participation was
restricted to the implementation of the "positive" policy. By his
own admission, however, he knew that the "positive" policy was
but a part of a design rendered criminal by the "negative" coun-
terpart. Specifically, this Nazi worthy was found to have gained
knowledge of most of the torture under the guise of medical
"experiments," some of it, as in the case of his knowledge of
the freezing experiments conducted at Dachau, through personal
conferences with the perpetrators who received the benefit of
his advice on "scientific" matters."10 It is difficult in the face of
this avalanche of evidence to conclude with the court that the
evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt "that Poppen-
dick was criminally connected with the experiments." However,
even if this rationale be accepted, his mere connection with the
elite group would have been sufficient under prevailing common
107. 2 TRIALs OF WAR CuMINALs 248 (1946).
108. Ibid.
109. Id. at 250.
110. Id. at 249.
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law notions of conspiracy I" to charge him with criminal respon-
sibility for acts flowing from the criminal design to which he
had become a party. In this case his exoneration on the score
of personal responsibility did not include exoneration of respon-
sibility for having joined and remained a member of a criminal
organization with knowledge of its criminal activities.112 The
conspiracy dragnet had been used, but in a seriously curtailed
form. No abuse of its powers was observed. It was used spar-
ingly and with great circumspection. Any further restriction
of its scope would have resulted in its outright abandonment.
The latter would have constituted implicit endorsement of the
crime.
CONCLUSION
It has been customary democratic preference to permit the
escape of ninety-nine guilty men rather than suffer the injustice
of convicting one innocent. In stable democratic societies, this
represents a sound balancing of values. A policy tending toward
the enhancement of the respect due to individual dignity out-
balances the loss to society in the value of the successful prosecu-
tion of the guilty. It is arguable that transported into a culture
whose conception of individual justice is not in excess of
Malinowski's primitive society the meticulous concern for en-
forcing a rectitude norm through meticulous ascertainment of
individual guilt at the expense of the escape of large numbers
of guilty parties may turn into a perversion of the rectitude
norm itself and hence outright encouragement of crime. While
in a democratic society the balance between individual respect
and effective prosecution falls naturally in favor of the former,
the opposite may well be the result in a culture which is satu-
rated with blood. It was against the background of a culture sat-
urated with blood that the indicated group prosecution was con-
ceived subject to the highest possible degree of procedural safe-
guards.
111. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
112. See note 109 supra. The apparent leniency of the finding which
comported a ten year sentence was more than matched by subsequent
action. See Terencz, Nurnberg Trial Procedure and the Rights of the
Accused, 39 J. CraM. L. 144, 151 (1948): "... . in one of the most recent
cases 5 high-ranking SS officers who were convicted of membership in a
criminal organization with knowledge of its criminal activities, were
promptly released."
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Abandonment of such prosecution under Allied auspices as
authorized by the Nuremberg Charter embodied a body-blow to
democratic doctrine and practice within Germany and the
outside world. The harmful results of this abandonment are all
too apparent. The effectiveness of any machinery for prosecu-
tion of Nazi criminality rested inevitably upon the use of group
sanctions judiciously administered. Rejection of group sanctions
meant the collapse of the only effective machinery for prosecu-
tion possible under Allied Western auspices, and concomitantly
therewith, the resurgence of Nazism in Germany. The tragi-
comedy of an attempted prosecution under German auspices
need not be dignified with a formal discussion.
Group or collective sanctions are an accepted part of the
response within a common culture pattern when necessitated
by the dint of circumstance. Rational contemporary appraisal of
such sanctions as the summary deportation of Japanese-Amer-
icans is more concerned with an analysis of the claim of "neces-
sity" advanced by its protagonists than the admittedly inequi-
table hardship inflicted upon the group. It is customary human
preference to make individualization of justice wait upon the
claims of human survival. The use of group sanctions in Ger-
many rested upon infinitely more "compelling necessity" than
the Japanese cases and was subject to infinitely greater proce-
dural restraints.
The invocation of group sanctions under present security aus-
pices in such forms as the McCarran Act deserves examination
upon present merits, both in terms of necessity and procedural
safeguards. It is safe to conclude, however, that the precedent of
the Nuremberg prosecution did not help pave the ground for the
use of group or collective sanctions in this country. Factors oper-
ating for the invocation of such sanctions in Germany clearly
do not operate within this country. This is not a culture satu-
rated with blood and law enforcement is not confronted by
thousands of mass murderers roaming upon the countryside. It
is interesting to note that the chief opponents of the prosecution
of Nazi criminality in Germany are now numbered among the
chief proponents of collective sanctions under current security
auspices in this country.113 Thus, regardless of 6ne's personal
113. U.S. Senator McCarthy provides a prime example. For a docu-
mented description of the Senator's tactics on a national level see Litwi-
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attitude concerning the use of collective or group sanctions under
present circumstances it is not difficult to conclude that their
abandonment in Germany was a disaster.
MOR, ORDRAL BY SLANDER (1950). For the Senator's reaction to established
Nazi crime, see, e.g., N. Y. Times, April 23, 1949, p. 4:
"A Senate Armed Services subcommittee investigating United States
military justice in the Malmedy cases interrogated key figures today against
the background of an eyewitness story told dispassionately by a survivor
of the Nazi massacre of United States prisoners of war from the Battle of
the Bulge...
(a) survivor . . . Kenneth F. Ahrens of Erie, Pa. . . . found himself
with his whole company, suddenly cut off by a SS battalion at a crossroad
near Malmedy, Belgium. There was no chance of resistance, he said, and
his outfit surrendered as prisoners of war. Soon, he said, they were
mowed down by machine-gun bursts from tanks. . . Senator McCarthy
objected to the testimony by Mr. Ahrens as being of a nature that would
inflame the public and perhaps obscure the handling of justice by the
military."
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